This paper presents an empirical micro-simulation model of the teaching and the testing process in the classroom . It is a non-econometric micro-simulation model describing informational behaviors of the pupils, based on the observation of the pupils' communication behavior during lessons and tests. The representation of the knowledge process is very simplified. However, we tried to study the involvements of individual motivation, capability and relationship with other pupils of each pupil, to compare them to the new-classical(and keynesian) and Austrian information and knowledge theoretical results. It is a first step and future development should concern expectation behaviors and dynamics. This paper aims too to give, we hope so, some criteria of pupils' rationality in the classroom.
"Time is mali" one of my students.
Since the famous experiences of E.H. Chamberlin (1948) and then V.L. Smith (1962) , the classroom has become a favorite field of applied micro or macroeconomics laws of the experimental economics (G. Delemeester & J.Brauer 2000) . In the usual experiment design, pupils play some economic roles, and the teacher leads experiment. The modelling of the classroom is mainly educational or psychological 1 , however pupils and teacher rarely play their own role (R.Fernandez & J.Gali, 1999 ; R.Gary-Bobo & A.Trannoy, 2004) .
Our purpose was to model the relationship between pupils and teacher in the classroom, during the lesson and during tests and exams. Our model is empirical -but not econometric -and based on observation 2 . The model calculates some micro-simulations 3 but it tries to explain and not to forecast any socioeconomic events. The classroom is considered as an information and knowledge complex market 4 . Indeed, in such a market, the teacher would appear as the main "supplier" of information and the pupils as "demanders", but information process in the classroom is actually rather more complex 5 . We have analyzed all the informational -listening, chatting and cheating one -behavior of pupils and the teacher during lessons and tests, and then translated them into a few simple equations.
Consequently, our major topic is clearly the modelling of educational learning 6 , but we believe we could obtain some results which could improve the understanding of the Economics of information too (R. Buda, 2000) . According to this, we'll consider the New-classical Economic School (G.S. Becker, 1964) through it's design of learning process, the New-keynesian Economic School (S.J. Grossman & J.E.Stiglitz, 1980) through its model of asymmetric information, and the Austrian Economic School (F.A. Hayek, 1937 Hayek, & 1945 through its process of knowledge discover.
In the first section, we'll present and describe the equations of the model 7 , then we'll explain the calibration of the model based on an actual data-sample. Then some anti-fraud policies will be presented and simulation displayed. Finally, we'll comment the empirical results and we'll bring them closer to the more relevant theoretical results, especially to compare them to the New-classical(and keynesian) imperfect market model and the Austrians economics knowledge process theoretical results.
I -The Equations of the Model
The class is composed of N pupils and one teacher. The teacher teaches a lesson which is divided into j periods. The pupils have to learn the lesson before the tests (exam, or competitive exam) . This test is divided into 20 parts 8 . The quarterly average of each pupil is calculated with their marks in each test.
Properties and behaviors -Each pupil i works with courage (C i ) and is able to understand the lesson according to his capabilities (A i ) 9 0 ≤ C i ≤ 200
(1) 0 ≤ A i ≤ 200
(2)
The teacher gives information to the pupils, puts the test and the marks according to the answers of each pupil. During the lesson, he can give boni b to the pupils who give good answers and help the teacher in making the understanding of the class increase. On the other hand, the teacher can give mali m to the pupils who are chatting during the lesson. Each bonus and malus (resp.) increases or decreases (resp.) one percent of the quarterly average.
Behaviors during lesson -When the teacher teaches the lesson, pupil i believes he has understood -translated by the encoding variable E i j -, but he did'nt because of his own chatting or the chatting around 10 . Then he consequently won't have to cheat during the test because he things he has the right answers. They are interested in some topics different from the lesson (L j ). Lessons and topics are divided into 20 parts, thus pupils choose at each moment between chatting or listening to the lesson. Pupil will pay attention during the lesson, if its weight (w L ) is greater than the weight of his chatting (w T ).
where c − 1 is the rank of the previous test and w M the weight of the mark. The weight of the course depends on the test too. During the lesson, the pupil i accumulates knowledge 11 (K i j ). Sometimes pupil i has well understood (K i j = L j ), but sometimes the pupil i has misunderstood (K i j = L j ) or has not listened to the lesson (K i j = 0) 12 . If a pupil i is chatting with a pupil k -exclusively during the j lapse of time -, both haven't recorded the information given (K i j = 0 and K k j = 0). The event of chatting depends on the expectation of the test -especially the cost of fraud (c F ) during the test.
At the end of each lesson, the aggregation of chatting's behavior is given by
There is a gap, when the pupil doesn't pay attention during lessons
hence
The chatting of some pupils can disturb the understanding of the weakest pupils, especially according to a few thresholds :
At the end of the lesson, pupil i accumulated the following level of knowledge 13 11) and the whole class
For each pupil if K i t ≤ K i 0 with 0 ≤ l ≤ 1 then the encoding capability is given by
that means pupil i will be able to understand the future lessons with a minimal level of knowledge K i 0 .
Behaviors during a test :
Pupil i answers to the test in writing papers P j . His answers depends on his knowledge (P i j = K i j ). If the answer is correct (K i j = L j ) then pupil i gets a point in his mark 14 (π i j = 1). Hence his total mark is
where fraud f = 1 if pupil is caught in free-riding behavior 15 -a microeconomic word which denotes the behavior of someone who uses a good without to pay it -, and c F the points which are lost by the free-rider pupil.
Nomenclature Chapter j of the current lesson 
II -Calibration of the Model
The sample of actual data (marks and other assessments) come from personal actual marks of pupils given by the author, as teacher. The pupils were pupils in a French high school of the western suburb of Paris -Lycée Guy de Maupassant (Colombes). Two classes studied Economics and law at the degree of "Classe de Premire -in French educational system" and one at the degree of "Classe de Terminale -in French educational system" -they prepared baccalaureate examination. The last class studied Administrative Management at the degree of "Classe de Terminale". All of them have been evaluated during a baccalaureate training test. Neither the author (the teacher) nor the pupils knew that the actual marks will be used into a simulation model, when the test happened.
The calibration of the model consisted to determine the value of some parameters of the equations of our model. So, we have iterated some simulations with different values of parameters, on an actual sample of four classes until to obtain simulated averages the most near from the actual one. The results of our calibration simulation are displayed on tables 3 and 4 describing the simulation of class #1, #2, #3 and #4. The result of the first (−0.28) and the third (0.37) class seem to be relatively good (error less than 4%). Unfortunately, the simulation of second (2.16) and the fourth (−2.40) class are relatively less good (error less than 30%). We could explain this greater error because the assumption of homogeneity of tests was probably too strong in fact. Furthermore, one of the pupils, # 022, did not respect the rules of the classroom (class #4).
As soon as our model was specified, we could use it to simulate some collective or scenarios to study the involvement of communication's behavior of the pupils to their performances. According to this purpose, the role of the teacher is obviously not neutral. 
Class #2
Pupil #001 
III -Anti-fraud Policies Simulations
After each lesson, we assume that the teacher gets a test to the pupils, and marks them. We have considered the oral activities of pupils during lesson. It is integrated into the evaluation of each pupil. Moreover, as we know, some pupils try to cheat during the tests to obtain some answers they ignore and the behavior of the teacher is not neutral to control it. We have selected four typical anti-fraud policies. Then we made run some collective and individual simulations.
Quarterly average's calculation -All the marks are collected into a quarterly average according to the following procedure. If we consider the bonus b = 1 and the malus m = −1, the oral score of pupil O is given by
100 (17) and the average of the cmax marks of each pupil i, M i , is calculated according to formula
Repression against fraud policies -Each teacher has got a reputation to his pupils. The pupils usually expect the reaction of their teacher in front of their cheating's behavior.
We designed four policies : #1 -the non-rigorous one : The teacher leaves its pupils communicating during tests. Consequently, the "free-rider" pupil never losses any point, #2 -the simple auctions policy one : During test, the first free-rider losses n points, then the following one losses n + 1 points, and so on.
When pupils cheat, we assumed they search information, but they have to minimize the lapse of time during they are communicating each others. We considered that during this lapse of time, they are not able to gain more than p points -during our actual tests p = 5. If someone free-rides, it means that the "price" of the information obtained is to much low, so free-rider losses 5 points and then the "price" increases one point more : p = 5 + 1 and so on. #3 -the no-return auctions policy one : The rule is the same as simple auctions policy but the cost of fraud never decreases between two tests, and #4 -the maximal repression one : The free-rider who is caught, losses all the points of the test -20 in the French assessment system.
Description and results of the simulations -We firstly made run four typical simulations to investigate the performances of the pupils according to the antifraud policy of the teacher -see Table 5 and 6. The first simulations gave us a collective answer, but we need to investigate according to an individual point of view.
So we have tried to analyze the individual rationality -see Table 7 -in making run some other simulations. We have chosen three typical (but not actual) pupils : pupil #5 (C 5 =92 and A 5 =45), pupil #20 (C 20 =23 and A 20 =121) and pupil #35 (C 35 =43 and A 35 =190). 
IV -Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Micro-simulation is an interesting technics, but we have to pay attention to our first results. Firstly, the behaviors we have modelled are unfortunately unobservable : chatting is rather observable, not free-riding 16 . So an experimental and questionnaire approach could help us to correct this drawback, especially to estimate the behavioral coefficients. Let's now examine the empirical results that we'll compare to the theoretical results, and present the future development.
An empirical analysis :
Most of our results - Table 5 and 6 -are not amazing, because they came from a mechanical process. The knowledge level decreases if the teacher does not supervise his exams and tests. Nevertheless tables 5 and 6 tell us the rate level of knowledge doesn't decrease so widely as we might have expected. No significant difference seems to exist between all the anti-fraud policies -we mean #2, #3 and #4. The non-rigorous policy (#1) doesn't incite pupils to pay attention during lessons (and to learn) 17 . The global level of knowledge decreases and so that, even if pupils can free ride during the test and exam, free riding becomes inefficient and useless -see Table 8 .
To investigate the individual point of view, we have made three simulations - Table 7 : the basic simulation (non given), "honest" one (the pupil never freerides), and "free-rider" one (the pupil free-rides). We found that in the "honest" one, the level of knowledge is good, but in the "free-rider" one, the free-rider pupil makes the other (especially the weakest one) fail. Free-riding is no use to the pupils who have the strongest intellectual capabilities. However, some other simulations seem necessary to confirm our first results, and to give a better interpretation of our indicators.
A recall of the theoretical context : The educational learning process is an important topic of the New-classical Economic Thought that was illustrated by G.S. Becker (1964) . The learning is considered as an human investment process according to the competition model. However, this pattern is difficult to model in an individual level and on a short run 18 -pupils rarely expect the returns from the tests and a fortiori from the lessons.
Paradoxically, neither New-classical(and keynesian) in their Economics of information nor Austrian in their Knowledge discover process, use the educational field which should be an evident field of analysis. The Information (and Knowledge) concept didn't appear at the beginning of the History of the Political Economy 19 . In the competitive model of production of the new-classical thought of the end of the ninetieth century, the admitted assumption was that the economic agent has got freely all relevant information he needs to make his own decision 20 . The Austrian economists denied this assumption, in explicating that the market mechanism is explained because of the lack of information of individual agents (F.A. Hayek, 1945) but the both economic thoughts agreed about the selfregulatory of the market economy. After 1929 crises, the Keynesian economists questioned this self-regulatory -F.A. Hayek (1937) linked it to the information's process discovery. Information is dispersed among the individuals and available through the commodities price. Since the seventies, the information is became an important theoretical economic topic. It consisted to leave one of the assumptions of the pure and perfect competition model and to explain the persistent disequilibrium of the market. Especially S.J.Grossman and J.E.Stiglitz proposed the paradoxical result that if a market is efficient in terms of information, all relevant information is already reflected in market prices, then no individual would be incited to acquire the information on which prices are grounded 21 .
An essay of theoretical interpretations of the model : One of the results of our model was that a classroom where the teacher leaves pupils free to communicate has worse test results than one where teacher control the communication between pupils. We can translate this results so : when pupils expect free-riding without cost, they don't learn lesson and then they have to ask neighbors during test. But neither individual pupil nor his neighbors are incited to learn, so no pupil is able to answer and so to succeed the test. If one of the pupils had learnt lesson, he would have produced public information, because he should have to give it to other pupils of the classroom. Except if he agrees to give information to other pupils, he has no interest to make so according to an effort/marks analysis 22 . We obtain a variant of Grossman-Stiglitz effect" (S.J. Grossman and J.E.Stiglitz, 1980) linked to the public information : no individual could make profit in producing public information.
Fundamentally, pupils have a search information's behavior to produce answer that teacher is waiting for. Such a behavior should obviously take place during lesson but not during test or exam. During our actual tests, we usually tell to our pupils that c F (fraud cost) doesn't represent a punishment but the price they have to pay to buy the cheating information. Consequently, pupils have to choose between two behaviors : producing answer (by learning) or "buying" cheating information with a high probability to buy a wrong answer -they usually don't know if they "buy" the right answer.
In fact, the free-rider try to achieve a wrong goal in optimizing a score (the average mark) instead of acquiring knowledge (by listening and understanding the lesson) 23 , in other words, in producing their own information 24 .
The next development of the model : They should concern the expectation's behavior 25 , the long run dynamics. Moreover, some functions should be revised, especially the encoding function 26 E i j , the learning function K i j , the lesson function L j which could be build as a network, and the mark parameter π i j which could be no more boolean. The design of knowledge provided by F. Machlup (1984) could help us to perform the specification 27 . Moreover, we'll keep our non a priori theoretical point of view -our empirical model doesn't belong to one economic thought or to one other -and we'll try to understand the pupil's behavior in front of knowledge, and finally, we hope so, get some criteria of the pupil's rationality 28 in the classroom. 2 -It is based on the experience of the author, who teaches economics, law and management in high school and economics at university.
3 -According to the micro-simulation principles described by G.H. Orcutt (1957) , even if this author initially promoted micro-econometric models. "Microsimulation (a.k.a. microanalytic simulation) is a modelling technique that operates at the level of individual units such as persons, households, vehicles or firms. Within the model each unit is represented by a record containing a unique identifier and a set of associated attributes e.g. a list of persons with known age, sex, marital and employment status; or a list of vehicles with known origins, destinations and operational characteristics. A set of rules (transition probabilities) are then applied to these units leading to simulated changes in state and behavior. These rules may be deterministic (probability=1), such as changes in tax liability resulting from changes in tax regulations, or stochastic (probability≤1), such as chance of dying, marrying, giving birth or moving within a given time period. In either case the result is an estimate of the outcomes of applying these rules, possibly over many time steps, including both total overall aggregate change and, crucially, the distributional nature of any change." International Microsimulation Association. The microsimulation belongs to a more general individual modelling approach called Agent-based Computational Economics (a.k.a. ACE) -see N. Gilbert (2008, pp.17-18) about then links between Microsimulation and the ACE and L.Tesfatsion and K.L.Judd (Eds) (2006) for a wider overview. 4 -See L.R. Anderson and C.A.Holt (1996) about an experimental analysis of information, but where pupils and the teacher didn't play their own role. 5 -Especially, relationship between pupils and teachers could be view as a game. See our paper (1996) .
